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Executive Summary
Transnational exchanges of plant, microbial and
animal genetic resources are essential for scientific
and agricultural research as well as for downstream
commercial applications in many important
fields, including food security and medicines.
Exports of in situ plant cultivars and microbial
specimens discovered through bioprospecting
require the permission of provider governments
under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
of 1992, with specific regard to prior informed
consent (PIC), mutually agreed terms (MAT) and
access and benefit-sharing (ABS) agreements. Ex situ
plant cultivars for both research and applications
are available from seed banks governed by the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA, 2001), subject
to benefit-sharing obligations imposed on
commercial applications by standard material
transfer agreements (SMTAs). Similarly, ex situ
microbial specimens are made available for
research and applications from public repositories
governed by the World Federation for Culture
Collections (WFCC) under SMTAs consistent
with the CBD. In all cases, the use of traditional
knowledge associated with genetic resources
requires the permission of relevant Indigenous
populations, including PIC, MAT and ABS.
The Nagoya Protocol to the CBD (2010), entered into
force in 2014, further requires all member countries
to cooperate in cross-border enforcement of the
CBD’s provisions. Under the protocol, end products
based on or derived from genetic resources,
including genomic sequence data, will become
subject to seizure by national checkpoints unless
they comply with the CBD. Compliance certificates
will be made available for this purpose by a clearing
house to be established under the protocol.

it should consider reorganizing itself as an
international regime for facilitated exchanges of
ex situ microbial materials, with a built-in takeand-pay rule for commercial applications. Such a
redesigned Microbial Research Commons should
adopt a science-friendly governance structure that
improves upon the scheme implemented by the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s
(FAO’s) ITPGRFA, and it should also incorporate
the World Data Centre for Microorganisms
(WDCM), currently situated in China.

The Propertization of
Plant, Microbial and
Animal Genetic Resources
Transnational exchanges of plant, microbial
and animal genetic resources, together with
traditional knowledge concerning their uses
by Indigenous communities, have always been
essential components of human survival and
economic stability.1 As Evanson Chege Kamau
succinctly framed it, “No country is self-sufficient:
all depend on crops and genetic diversity within
these crops from other countries and regions.”2
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, bioprospectors could freely explore
biodiversity-rich environments, often located in
colonies governed by the economic powers of the
day, in order to discover and isolate in situ genetic
resources of potential interest to their respective

1

See e.g. Kevin McCluskey et al, “The U.S. Culture Collection Network
Responding to the Requirements of the Nagoya Protocol on Access
and Benefit Sharing” (2017) 8:4 mBio 1 (stating that “access to living
resources has been foundational to research, health care, agriculture,
and industry since the beginning of modern biology” at 2); Christine
Godt, “Networks of ex situ collections of genetic resources” in Evanson
Chege Kamau & Gerd Winter, eds, Common Pools of Genetic Resources:
Equity and Innovation in International Biodiversity Law (London, UK:
Routledge, 2013), 246 [Common Pools of Genetic Resources]. See
also National Research Council, A New Biology for the 21st Century
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2009), emphasizing the
fundamental importance of microbiology in a New Biology paradigm.

2

Evanson Chege Kamau, “The multilateral system of the International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture: lessons and
room for further development” in Common Pools of Genetic Resources,
supra note 1 at 343, n 1.

With specific regard to science policy, article
4 of the Nagoya Protocol expressly validates
multilateral regimes of facilitated access to
ex situ genetic resources for both basic and
applied research, subject to built-in “take-andpay” rules for commercial applications. The
ITPGRFA was thus rendered legally consistent
with the CBD by dint of the Nagoya Protocol.
The WFCC has developed SMTAs to cover its
activities as “trusted intermediaries.” However,
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scientific, agricultural or industrial endeavours.3
Once scientifically validated, particularly important
exemplars of these in situ genetic resources were
often deposited in ex situ public repositories, such
as the agricultural seed banks managed by the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR)4 and — for microbial specimens
— the WFCC.5 Operating as basic components
of the global scientific infrastructure, these
repositories provided both public and private users
with ex situ genetic resources, normally (but not
uniformly) at the marginal cost of distribution,
as befitted their status as global public goods.6
The once-customary view that genetic resources,
together with associated traditional knowledge,
constituted the “common heritage of mankind”7
was first directly challenged in 1962, when the
United Nations adopted a declaration on the
sovereignty of states over natural resources.8 By the

2

3

See generally Jerome H Reichman, Paul F Uhlir & Tom Dedeurwaerdere,
Governing Digitally Integrated Genetic Resources, Data, and Literature:
Global Intellectual Property Strategies for a Redesigned Microbial
Research Commons (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) ch 2,
s 1 (“Historical Importance of Genetic Resources as Global Public Goods”).

4

CGIAR, “Crop Genebank Knowledge Base”, online: <http://cropgenebank.
sgrp.cgiar.org>. See e.g. Michael Halewood, “Governing the management
and use of pooled microbial genetic resources: Lessons from the global crop
commons” (2010) 4:1 Intl J Commons 404. See generally Reichman, Uhlir &
Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 46–50, 112–15, 121–30 (explaining the
role of the CGIAR under the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) of 2001).

5

WFCC, “About WFCC”, online: <www.wfcc.info/about/>. See e.g.
David Smith, Dagmar Fritze & Erko Stackebrandt, “Public Service
Collections and Biological Resource Centers of Microorganisms” in
Eugene Rosenberg et al, eds, The Prokaryotes: Prokaryotic Biology and
Symbionic Associations (Berlin: Springer, 2013) 267.

6

See generally Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 2 at
37–82 (“Between Private and Public Goods: Emergence of the Transnational
Research Commons for Plant and Microbial Genetic Resources”). One of
the world’s major suppliers of ex situ genetic resources, the American Type
Culture Collection (ATCC), has operated on a commercial basis since losing US
government funding in the 1960s. See ATCC, “About ATCC” [ATCC], online:
<www.atcc.org/en/About/About_ATCC.aspx>.

7

See International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, UNFAO Res
8/83, 22nd Sess (5–23 November 1983). See also Reichman, Uhlir &
Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 50–52 (“Short-Lived Recognition of
Plant Genetic Resources as the Common Heritage of Mankind”).

8

See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, GA Res 1803
(XVII), UNGAOR UN Doc A/RES/1803 (1962) [1962 Declaration].
For a skeptical view of claims to ex situ genetic resources, based on a
misunderstood interpretation of the “common heritage” principle, see
Jonathan Curci, The Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge
in International Law of Intellectual Property (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2010) at 9. See also Graham Dutfield, Intellectual
Property, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 2nd ed
(Abingdon, UK: Earthscan, 2004) at 5–6. For the demise of the common
heritage principle and its implications, for plant genetic resources in
particular, see Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 2,
ss I.B, III.A.
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1990s, when the most-developed countries were
demanding universal respect for patented microbes
and plant breeders’ rights under what eventually
became the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)
of 1994,9 the developing countries struck back with
“biopiracy” claims of their own. Specifically, they
argued that the downstream innovations protected
by intellectual property (IP) rights in the Global
North were often based on genetic resources taken
from the biodiversity-rich countries, along with
associated traditional knowledge of Indigenous
populations. From this perspective, unauthorized
use of these same genetic resources and traditional
knowledge, even for public research purposes,
constituted an illegal encroachment on their
territorial sovereignty.10 In 1992, that thesis became
firmly established in the CBD, now signed by some
190 countries.11 The United States is also a signatory,
but Congress has never ratified this treaty.12
The professed goal of harmonized IP rights under
the TRIPS Agreement was to stimulate higher
levels of investment in innovation generally. This
initiative responded to opportunities generated by
an increasingly integrated global marketplace, in
which commercial transfers of technology could
occur without territorial governments imposing

9

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
15 April 1994, 108 Stat 4809, 1869 UNTS 299 art 27 [TRIPS
Agreement]; International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, 2 December 1961, 33 UST 2703, 815 UNTS 89
(as subsequently amended) 1978 and 1991. See e.g. Julianna Santilli,
Agrobiodiversity and the Law: Regulating Genetic Resources, Food
Security and Cultural Diversity (Abingdon, UK: Earthscan, 2012). Plant
variety protection systems covered new plant varieties that are distinct,
uniform and stable for a limited period of time, initially on a copyrightlike model, eventually on a patent-like model. See JH Reichman, “Legal
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms” (1994) 94 Colum L
Rev 2432 at 2465–72.

10 See e.g. Burton Ong, “Harnessing the Biological Bounty of Nature:
Mapping the Wilderness of Legal, Socio-Cultural, Geo-Political and
Environmental Issues” in Burton Ong, ed, Intellectual Property and
Biological Resources: Perspectives on contemporary issues (Singapore:
Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004) at 1, 3–4, 18. See also Sarah A
Laird, ed, Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge: Equitable Partnerships
in Practice (London, UK: Earthscan: 2002).
11 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79,
31 ILM 818 (entered into force 29 December 1993) [CBD], online: <www.
cbd.int/convention/text>.
12 US Department of State, “Treaties Pending in the Senate (updated as of
May 8, 2017)”, online: <www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/>.

protectionist trade barriers.13 The professed aim
of the CBD was to support the conservation of
genetic resources by provider countries, especially
the developing countries, and to reward their
Indigenous populations whose traditional
knowledge may have informed commercial
applications of those same genetic resources.14
In effect, the CBD imposed territorial sovereignty
on all genetic resources, as well as related
traditional knowledge, and it conditioned the
rights of anyone — including research scientists
— to remove or otherwise use such resources
on the permission of the relevant government
authorities.15 Key implementing provisions are
found in articles 15 and 16. Article 15(2) establishes
the authority of national governments to regulate
access to genetic resources under domestic
legislation.16 Access, where granted, shall be on
terms that are mutually agreed,17 subject to PIC,18
with fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising
from research and development.19 Traditional
knowledge of Indigenous communities is expressly
included within these same ABS obligations.20
In principle, developing-country providers of genetic
resources should also obtain access to — and
transfer of — technology that makes use of their
genetic resources, “including technology protected
by patents and other intellectual property rights,
on mutually agreed terms.”21 Also included in this
scheme are permissions for publications or transfers
of genetic information based on relevant genetic

13 See e.g. Keith E Maskus, Private Rights and Public Problems: The Global
Economics of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century, 2nd ed (Washington,
DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012); Peter K Yu, “The
International Enclosure Movement” (2007) 82 Ind LJ 827; JH Reichman,
“Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under
the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement” (1998) 29 Intl Lawyer 345,
online: <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/687>.
14 See e.g. Evanson C Kamau & Gerd Winter, eds, Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge & the Law: Solutions for Access & Benefit
Sharing (London, UK: Earthscan, 2009); Regine Andersen, Governing
Agrobiodiversity: Plant Genetics and Developing Countries (Farnham,
UK: Ashgate, 2008); Charles McManis, ed, Biodiversity & the Law:
Intellectual Property, Biotechnology & Traditional Knowledge (London,
UK: Earthscan, 2007); Dutfield, supra note 8.
15 See CBD, supra note 11, arts 2, 8, 15–16, 19–20.
16 Ibid, art 15(2).
17 Ibid, art 15(4).
18 Ibid, art 15(5).
19 Ibid, art 15(7).
20 Ibid, art 8(j).
21 Ibid, art 16(3).

resources and the duty to share benefits from
commercial uses of ex situ specimen collections.22
A multilateral benefit-sharing fund should also be
established by the COP for purposes of managing
both mandatory and voluntary contributions.23
Taken together, these provisions of the CBD
established the premises for an international regime
of misappropriation with respect to unauthorized
uses of genetic resources — plant, microbial, animal
— and all related traditional knowledge originating
from the territories of nation-states adhering to the
CBD.24 Under what may be deemed the “bilateral
approach,” research scientists in Occitania who
want to study plant or microbial genetic resources
originating from Ruritania must negotiate first with
the Ruritanian government (PIC); sign an agreement
with the designated national authority; obtain
legitimate access to the specimens; and agree to
the conditions under which any commercial gains
from the research results will be shared with the
provider country (“on fair and equitable terms”).25
However, as reasonable as these arrangements
may sound, they are in practice onerous and
often unworkable from the scientific researchers’
perspective. In the first place, provider countries
have been slow to enact implementing legislation,
and, once enacted, these laws tend to be diverse
and complicated, and often full of both legal
and practical uncertainties.26 Second, there is no
consensus regarding ABS obligations applicable to
genetic resources acquired before 1993, when the

22 See e.g. Tomme Young et al, “Analysis of Claims of ‘Unauthorized Access
and Misappropriation of Genetic Resources and Associated Traditional
Knowledge’” in Tomme Young, ed, Governing ABS: Addressing the
Need for Sectoral, Geographical, Legal, and International Integration
in the ABS Regime (Gland, Switzerland: International Union for the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources [IUCN], 2009) 97 at 117.
See also Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 91–99.
23 See CBD, supra note 11, arts 20–21.
24 See e.g. Young et al, supra note 22 at 98–116.
25 See also Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 91–96
(citing authorities).
26 See e.g. Margo A Bagley & Arti K Rai, The Nagoya Protocol and
Synthetic Biology: A Look at the Potential Impacts (Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2013) at 16–17,
online: <www.synbioproject.org/site/assets/files/1276/nagoya_final.
pdf>. See also Darrell A Posey & Graham Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual
Property: Toward Traditional Resource Rights for Indigenous Peoples
and Global Communities (Ottawa: International Development Research
Centre, 1996) at 147–53 (stressing the need for overseas collectors to
fulfill conditions acceptable to local providers of biological resources
before access is granted, as well as the rights of local communities to veto
commercial applications and to share the benefits when they agree to
commercialization).
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CBD took effect.27 This same problem resurfaced
with the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol to
the CBD in 2010,28 as discussed below.29
Still another complicating factor is that some
countries, such as Canada and the United
States, are both providers and users of genetic
resources covered by the CBD.30 Moreover,
even a country that does not typically
provide in situ genetic resources or related
traditional knowledge may nonetheless be
the place where major providers of ex situ
genetic resources are located, as occurs
with the ATCC in the United States.31
Disregarding these and other technical legal
issues, the ex ante negotiations obligatory under
the CBD are ill-suited to the needs of early-stage
scientific research, for the following reasons.
→→ They entail very high transaction costs and other
technical and administrative barriers to research.
→→ In situ resources are intrinsically of
uncertain value until later scientific
work is done to validate them and
evaluate potential applications.
→→ National authorities in developing countries
tend to cling to their in situ genetic resources
and thereby impose very restrictive conditions
that sometimes make it difficult for their
own scientists, let alone foreign researchers,
27 See e.g. Bagley & Rai, supra note 26 at 17–20; see further Thomas
Greiber et al, An Explanatory Guide to the Nagoya Protocol on Access
and Benefit-sharing (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No 83)
(Gland, Switzerland & Bonn, Germany: IUCN & IUCN Environmental
Law Centre, 2012) at 72–73.
28 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 October 2010 (Montreal:
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011) (entered into
force 12 October 2014) [Nagoya Protocol], online: <www.cbd.int/abs/
doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf>. See also Report of the Sixth
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, The Hague, 7–19 April 2002, UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20
(27 May 2002) at Annex 2, online: <www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/
cop-06/official/cop-06-20-en.pdf>; Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic
Resources and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their
Utilization (Montreal: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
2002), online: <www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf>.
29 See below notes 59–82 and accompanying text.
30 See e.g. Chidi Oguamanam, “Genetic Resources & Access and Benefit
Sharing: Policies, Prospects and Opportunities for Canada after Nagoya”
(2011) 22:2 J Envtl L & Prac 87 at 108–11; see also ATCC, supra note 6.
31 See ATCC, supra note 6. See further Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere,
supra note 3, ch 4 (“The Existing Microbial Research Commons Confronts
Proprietary Obstacles”).

4
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to obtain in situ (or even ex situ) specimens
from seed banks or culture collections.32
In short, under the bilateral or case-by-case
approach, each party tends to overvalue or
undervalue the potential worth of any given
specimen, before value-adding research has been
undertaken. This tendency impedes research and
threatens to limit not only research outputs but
also the development of medicines and agricultural
or other end products in the first place, resulting
in fewer benefits to share for everybody.33
Faced with these obstacles, scientists depend
increasingly on access to ex situ plant and microbial
genetic resources made available from agricultural
seed banks and microbial culture collections
around the world,34 as well as on deposits of
genomic data in publicly available repositories.35
Once identified and validated by experts, these
ex situ genetic resources are made freely available
for public and private research under SMTAs
that typically attempt to distinguish between
commercial and non-commercial research.36
From an international legal perspective, however,
a big question left on the table after 1993 was
whether these time-honoured scientific research
practices remained valid under the CBD. In other
words, were the ex situ public seed banks and
microbial culture collections legally operational
under the CBD after 1992 — or were they persistent
violators that distributed misappropriated genetic
materials in violation of international law?

32 Cf Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, at 100–106
(“The Threat to Public Scientific Research on Plant and Microbial
Genetic Resources”).
33 See ibid at 106–10 (“Major Weaknesses of the ‘Bilateral Approach’”),
250–56.
34 See ibid at 111–18; see also Sarah A Laird & Rachel P Wynberg
(with contributions from Arash Iranzadeh & Anna Sliva Kooser),
“The Emergence and Growth of Digital Sequence Information in Research
and Development: Implications for the Conservation and Sustainable Use
of Biodiversity, and Fair and Equitable Benefit Sharing” (9 November 2017)
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity Fact-Finding and
Scoping Study, online: <www.researchgate.net/publication/321005788_
The_Emergence_and_Growth_of_Digital_Sequence_Information_in_
Research_and_Development_Implications_for_the_conservation_and_
sustainable_use_of_biodiversity_and_fair_and_equitable_benefit_sharing>.
35 See Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 8 (“Fully
Exploiting Data-Intensive Research Opportunities in the Networked
Environment”).
36 Ibid, ch 4 at 170–98 (citing authorities). But see ibid, ch 4 at 199–209
(“Contractual Restrictions on Access to and Use of Upstream Microbial
Genetic Resources in Both Developed and Developing Countries”),
210–30 (“The Research Community Pushes Back”).

The Legal Status of Ex
Situ Plant and Microbial
Transactions after the
Nagoya Protocol (2010)
The primary value of public seed banks and
microbial culture collections is to serve as inputs
to basic research, with unknown outcomes,
including eventual commercial applications.37
Nevertheless, it was clear from the outset that
public scientific repositories would have to
comply with the CBD,38 given that the CBD
itself failed to acknowledge the importance of
exempting basic scientific infrastructure. The
task of conforming the operations of these ex situ
collections to the ABS obligations of the CBD was,
however, greatly complicated by the failure of
the CBD to specify how its multilateral regime of
misappropriation was to be enforced in practice.
The immediate result of this tension and
uncertainty was a crisis for the agricultural and
microbiological research communities with
regard to access to both ex situ plant and microbial
genetic resources. The very legality of the public
seed banks, indispensable for agricultural science,
and of the culture collections, indispensable for
microbiology, was called into question, while the
CGIAR was reportedly on the verge of collapse.39
In the late 1990s, the FAO responded to this
emergency by sponsoring an international

37 See e.g. David Smith, “Culture Collections” (2012) 79 Advances in
Applied Microbiology 73 at 75–76; Cletus Kurtzman, “The Agricultural
Research Service Culture Collection: Germplasm Accessions and
Research Programs” in Paul F Uhlir, ed, Designing the Microbial Research
Commons: Proceedings of an International Symposium (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2011) 55; Derek Byerlee & HJ Dubin, “Crop
Improvement in the CGIAR as a Global Success Story of Open Access and
International Collaboration” (2010) 4:1 Intl J Commons 452 at 456–57.
38 See e.g. WFCC, “Information Document on Access to ex-situ Microbial
Genetic Resources within the Framework of the Convention on Biological
Diversity” (1996) (background document submitted to the UNEP/
PBD/COP/3/Inf.19), online: <www.wfcc.info/index.php/wfcc_library/
genetic_res/>; see also EC, Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on compliance measures for
users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union
(text with EEA relevance), [2014] OJ, L 150/59 [EU Regulation 511/2014].
39 Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 3 at 111–17
(“Destabilizing the Exchange of Plant and Microbial Genetic Resources
as Global Public Goods”).

treaty to rescue and legitimatize the CGIAR’s
public seed banks for plant cultivars. A primary
objective was to legally establish the seed banks
as an international entity operating under the
auspices of a multilateral treaty of facilitated
access that would authorize them to continue
exchanging ex situ plant cultivars for research
and breeding purposes. This project gave rise
to the ITPGRFA of 2001,40 which for the sake of
convenience we may call the “crop commons.”41
The ITPGRFA, which is administered by the
FAO, promotes the conservation of plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture and
the equitable sharing of benefits from the use
thereof for sustainable agriculture and food
security.42 In so doing, the treaty also established
a built-in benefit-sharing regime for users of ex
situ plant cultivars accessed from the CGIAR’s
seed banks.43 Under this regime, would-be
commercial users were subject to a liability
rule, that is, a take-and-pay rule, embodied in
the treaty and enforced by SMTAs. Commercial
plant breeders who wished to take cultivars from
the crop commons were required in principle
to pay a small royalty on sales of downstream
applications to the benefit-sharing fund of the
multilateral system, but they were not obliged to
negotiate directly with provider governments.44
Moreover, the ITPGRFA forbids users to take
IP rights on ex situ plant cultivars in the form

40 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,
3 November 2001, 2400 UNTS 303 (entered into force 29 June 2004)
[ITPGRFA].
41 See e.g. Laurence R Helfer, “Comment II: Using Intellectual Property
Rights to Preserve the Global Genetic Commons: The International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture” in Keith
E Maskus & Jerome H Reichman, eds, International Public Goods and
Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 217 at 217–19.
42 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, arts 5–6. For specific crops covered so far,
see Annex I.
43 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, arts 10–15. The treaty also envisioned that
in situ plant genetic resources residing in the public domain of provider
countries would also be placed under the multilateral regime, but these
provisions have so far not been implemented. See ibid, arts 4, 7. For
further details about ITPGRFA see Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere,
supra note 3 at 119–130. For the SMTAs, see ibid, ch 3 at 125–29.
44 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, arts 10–15. See further Daniele Manzella,
“The design and mechanics of the multilateral system of access and
benefit sharing” in Michael Halewood, Isabel López Noriega & Selim
Louafi, eds, Crop Genetic Resources as a Global Commons: Challenges
in International Law and Governance (Abingdon, UK: Earthscan, 2013),
150 at 156 [Crop Genetic Resources]; Santilli, supra note 9 at 143.
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received from the multilateral system.45 Users can,
however, protect downstream applications of plant
cultivars received from the system, subject to the
payment of a small royalty to the benefit-sharing
fund from sales of end products. The Governing
Body (composed of member governments) was
established to manage this international regime,
and the FAO itself volunteered to enforce its
SMTAs and related decisions when needed.46
However, the strengths of the ITPGRFA were partly
offset by a number of weaknesses.47 For example,
the take-and-pay rule could be waived if the
commercial users agreed to allow a broad research
exemption for further uses of any new plant
varieties subsequently developed and protected
either by patents or plant breeders’ rights.48 But
why should commercial users of genetic resources
be allowed to waive benefit-sharing royalties when
the whole purpose of a multilateral regime was to
support research and applications? One would have
expected a multilateral regime to provide both a
research exemption for science and a reasonable
royalty under the take-and-pay regime to support
the costs of the multilateral system, if nothing else.
Furthermore, the ITPGRFA expressly disavowed
any tracking requirements for plant cultivars
(unlike the public microbial culture collections).49
Still another notable defect is that the Governing
Body consists entirely of government appointees,
with little voice and no voting rights for the
relevant scientific and Indigenous communities.50
Notwithstanding these and other flaws in the
design of the ITPGRFA, administrators of the crop
commons have been remarkably successful in
managing and further developing the multilateral
regime for facilitated access to plant genetic
resources. A major turning point occurred in
2006 when agreements between the Governing
45 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, art 12.3(b)(e).
46 Ibid, arts 10–15; Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at
119–130 (citing authorities); 496–504 for analysis of the Governing
Body.
47 Compare Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 131–35
(“Demonstrable Achievements”) with 135–42 (“Major Weaknesses”).
48 See FAO Conference, Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, “Standard Material Transfer Agreement” (2006), at para
6(8) [FAO Conference], online: <www.fao.org/3/a-bc083e.pdf>.
49 ITPGRFA, supra note 40, art 13(3). However, a general notification of use
must be sent to the Governing Body.
50 See further Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 496–99
(“A Two-Headed Governance Construct”).
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Body and the CGIAR’s international agricultural
research centres (IARCs)51 reaffirmed the status
of ex situ collections held by the centres as
“global public goods” and formally placed their
seed banks under the auspices of the treaty.52
Thus shielded politically, the seed banks have
been distributing about 600 plant cultivars per
day to researchers and commercial breeders in
both developed and developing countries under
SMTAs approved by the Governing Body.53
There has also been an increase of materials
sent to the centres by developing countries
after a decade of decline, and some important
agricultural research institutes not affiliated
with the CGIAR have also joined the system.54
Voluntary contributions to the benefit-sharing
fund have also flowed in, enabling the Secretariat
to fund numerous training courses and research
publications.55 About 3,500 new plant varieties
have been evaluated for resilience to stresses.56
A global information system on plant genetic
resources is also being constructed, and is expected
to become a major resource for agricultural
research data available on an open-access basis.57
Notwithstanding these accomplishments under
the treaty, or perhaps because of its very success,
there was a perceived need to solidify its legal
foundations with respect to two underlying
concerns. First, given that the CBD, as drafted
in 1992, had contemplated only a state-to-state
bilateral regime of ABS, was the establishment of
a multilateral regime for facilitated access to plant
genetic resources legally consistent with the CBD?
Moreover, if the ITPGRFA and the CBD could be
rendered legally compatible in theory, the bigger
concern was their compatibility in practice. More to
the point, how were pending proposals concerning

51 Eight CGIAR-affiliated IARCs, with a total of nearly 700,000 ex situ
accessions, were parties to this agreement. See Isabel López Noriega,
Peterson Wambugu & Alejandro Mejías, “Assessment of progress to make
the multilateral system functional: incentives and challenges at the country
level” in Crop Genetic Resources, supra note 44, 199 at 205.
52 For details, see Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at
121–30 (citing authorities).
53 Interview of Shakheel Bhatti, former director general of the ITPGRFA (10
October 2016).
54 Ibid; López Noriega, Wambugu & Mejías, supra note 51 at 205–6.
55 Communications provided by the Secretariat of the ITPGRFA to Duke
University School of Law (2016) (on file with the author).
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.

global enforcement of the CBD’s misappropriation
regime at the national level to be reconciled with
the very scientific and industrial uses of plant
genetic resources that the crop commons aimed to
promote? These and other related questions were
specifically addressed in the Nagoya Protocol to the
CBD of 2010, which entered into force in 2014.58

General Enforcement Measures
under the Nagoya Protocol
Articles 3, 12 and 16 of the Nagoya Protocol
expressly apply compliance measures to both the
genetic resources within the scope of the CBD and
the associated traditional knowledge.59 Besides
derivatives (broadly construed) and stand-alone
biochemical components of genetic resources,
ABS obligations under the CBD arguably cover
related data, know-how and other relevant
information pertaining to research on genetic
resources “up to their commercialization.”60
This conclusion follows in part because the
legislative history appears to include “sequencing
genes and genomes” within the definition of
“utilization of genetic resources” in article 2(c).61
Given this broad subject matter coverage, a primary
objective of the Nagoya Protocol was to oblige
signatory states to adopt compliance measures
that would make the CBD’s ABS requirements
enforceable at the local level, ideally in courts or
through other administrative processes.62 In this
context, access to traditional knowledge associated
with genetic resources was given explicit
consideration, including detailed compliance
obligations to be implemented in domestic

legislation.63 Transboundary cooperation with
respect to compliance is expressly required.64
The Nagoya Protocol does not prescribe any
uniform compliance text that member states
must adopt in this regard.65 However, the protocol
does encourage member states to develop model
contractual clauses for mutually agreed terms.66
It also requires states to establish national
checkpoints and focal points for purposes of
compliance, and to share relevant information
via a platform — the ABS Clearing-House — to be
established under the protocol.67 Also envisioned
are internationally recognizable certificates of
compliance to facilitate legitimate cross-border
transactions and to impede transgressors.68
Implicit in all these obligations is the risk
that non-compliant goods may be treated as
contraband and seized by national border agents.
In other words, here the developing countries
promoting the Nagoya Protocol have applied
lessons drawn from articles 41–61 of the TRIPS
Agreement of 1994, which first introduced strong
enforcement measures into international IP
law.69 To be sure, under the TRIPS Agreement,
members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) must establish border controls and other
measures to block or seize counterfeit knowledge
goods.70 The Nagoya Protocol, instead, imposes
duties of transborder cooperation to enforce ABS
obligations on all member states,71 along with the
previously mentioned national checkpoints and
focal points.72 Taken together, these and other
compliance measures could lead to a globalized
enforcement regime under the CBD that would
resemble that of TRIPS in many respects.

63 See ibid, arts 7, 12, 16. According to Gurdial Singh Nijar, “nothing
in the Protocol allows for access to publicly available TK [traditional
knowledge] or TK that is diffused and has no identifiable holders (and
that is consequently held by the State) without PIC and MAT.” See Nijar,
supra note 60 at 36.

58 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28.
59 Ibid, arts 1–3, 16. For broad definitions of “utilization of genetic
resources,” “biotechnology” and “derivatives,” all covered by the CBD,
see especially article 2.
60 See e.g. Gurdial Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit
Sharing of Genetic Resources: Analysis and Implementation Options for
Developing Countries (Research Paper No 36) (Geneva: South Centre,
2011) at 35.

64 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 11.
65 Ibid, arts 15–16.
66 Ibid, art 19.
67 Ibid, arts 6, 13, 15–16, 17(2).
68 Ibid, arts 6–7, 17(3).

61 See UNEP, Report of the Meeting of the Group of Legal and Technical
Experts on Concepts, Terms, Working Definitions, and Sectoral Approaches,
UN Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/7/2 (2008). See also Laird & Wynberg,
supra note 34.

69 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, arts 41–61.

62 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, arts 6–7, 12–16.

72 See ibid, art 13.

70 See ibid, arts 51–60.
71 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, arts 11, 14–18.
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As matters stand, non-compliant goods emanating
even from the few states not subscribing to
the CBD — notably the United States — will be
subject to any and all of the compliance measures
to be implemented under the Nagoya Protocol.
By the same token, products emanating from
the United States can presumably benefit from
certificates to be recognized by the ABS ClearingHouse, which should facilitate transit across
national checkpoints so long as compliance with
ABS obligations is properly documented.73

Measures Favouring
Scientific Research
Unlike the CBD as initially drafted in 1992,
the Nagoya Protocol expressly recognizes the
importance of scientific research as a supplier
of both monetary and non-monetary benefits to
the developing country members of the CBD.74
The protocol then drives this point home by
expressly validating the multilateral regime
of facilitated access to plant genetic resources
that the ITPGRFA established in 2001.75 To the
same end, the protocol bestows anticipatory
recognition on other multilateral regimes of
facilitated access to ex situ genetic resources that
may similarly promote scientific research in the
future, if they simultaneously ensure that benefits
from downstream commercial applications
will be shared with the relevant providers.76

73 See ibid, arts 11, 14–18.
74 See ibid, arts 5(4), 8(a), 9 (promoting research). See also Evanson Chege
Kamau, Bevis Fedder & Gerd Winter, The Nagoya Protocol on Access to
Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing: What Is New and What Are the
Implications for Provider and User Countries and the Scientific Community?
(2011) 6:3 L, Environment & Development J 246 at 256 (envisioning future
work on issues of scientific research), online: <www.lead-journal.org/
content/10246.pdf>.
75 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, arts 4(1), 4(4). The preamble
to the Nagoya Protocol also expressly acknowledges the fundamental
role of the ITPGRFA “for achieving food security worldwide and for
sustainable development of agriculture…and climate change,” and for the
multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing to be established under
the treaty.
76 Ibid, arts 4(2), 4(4). The preamble also expressly acknowledges the
importance of the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) efforts to
ensure “access to human pathogens for public health preparedness and
response purposes.” These efforts culminated in the WHO’s Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework Agreement (2011). See
WHO, Pandemic influenza preparedness Framework for the sharing
of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits, World
Health Assembly, Res WHA645 (24 May 2011), online: <www.who.int/
influenza/resources/pip_framework/en/>. For basic concepts of the PIP
Framework and its lessons for analogous pooling arrangements in the
future, see Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 233–49.
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To enforce this proviso as an outer limit on
scientific research, article 8(a) of the protocol
requires providers of ex situ genetic resources for
non-commercial research purposes to insert a
“change of intent” clause in every relevant SMTA.77
Such a clause would impose benefit-sharing
obligations on scientists whose research uses did in
fact lead to downstream commercial applications.
Scientific researchers must accordingly oblige
end-users to respect these benefit-sharing
commitments as part of any commercial
value chain resulting from relevant SMTAs.
For genetic resources emanating from established
multilateral regimes, such as the FAO’s ITPGRFA
or the WHO’s PIP Framework, a built-in take-andpay rule (that is, a liability rule) would presumably
satisfy the Nagoya Protocol.78 SMTAs issued
by the CGIAR’s seed banks, for example, can
contractually impose benefit-sharing obligations on
new commercial uses of plant cultivars obtained
before the adoption of the CBD in 1993.79 Similarly,
when the country of origin remains uncertain
or controversial, SMTAs can obligate end-users
who commercialize plant cultivars from the crop
commons to fulfil their ABS obligations by paying a
share of gross revenues into a benefit-sharing fund
established under the ITPGRFA for this purpose.80
The Nagoya Protocol would similarly establish the
Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism
for the payment of ABS obligations by endusers whenever the true provider country of the
resources in question cannot be identified.81 Even
then, however, serious questions may arise about
the coverage of related traditional knowledge
77 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 8(a). See further Kamau, Fedder &
Winter, supra note 74 at 258–59.
78 See above notes 42–46 and accompanying text. For a detailed analysis
of the take-and-pay regime (technically a “liability rule” and not an
“exclusive property right”) as embodied in the ITPGRFA, see Reichman,
Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 118–42 (analyzing both
strengths and weaknesses of the regime).
79 SMTAs can thus cure the legal ambiguity concerning the applicability of the
CBD to pre-1993 ex situ genetic resources and related traditional knowledge.
See e.g. Nijar, supra note 60 at 34, concerning “Temporal scope.”
80 See ITPGRFA, supra note 40, arts 13, 16(d)(ii). For the relevant SMTA,
see FAO Conference, supra note 48, arts 2, 6, 7 & 8. See generally
Michael Halewood, “International Efforts to Pool and Conserve Crop
Genetic Resources in Times of Radical Legal Change” in Mario Cimoli
et al, eds, Intellectual Property Rights: Legal and Economic Challenges
for Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 288. See
generally Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 125–30
(“Notification, Benefit-Sharing and the SMTA” under ITPGRFA).
81 See e.g. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 10 (“Global Multilateral
Benefit-Sharing Mechanism”).

under these provisions or related SMTAs, in the
absence of any multilateral agreements regulating
traditional knowledge already known beyond the
sphere of any given Indigenous community.82
Resolving these and other ABS issues, then,
becomes considerably more complicated when
providers of ex situ genetic resources do not
operate within the legal constraints imposed
by any international instrument consistent
with article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol.83 This
topic is discussed in the next section.

The Implications for
Science Policy
If the Nagoya Protocol has firmly established
the legitimacy of the crop commons in public
international law, it has simultaneously raised
new and potentially disruptive questions
concerning the operations of the pre-existing
microbial research commons under the aegis of
the WFCC.84 So far, the typical response of the
culture collections has been to cast themselves as
“trusted intermediaries” whose operations position
them midway between providers of non-monetary
research benefits and those that incur benefitsharing obligations under the protocol.85 To this
end, SMTAs authorize the use of ex situ microbial
specimens for most research purposes, while
imposing contractual obligations to share benefits
with provider countries under viral licences that
cover commercial applications of research results.86

In this same vein, the European Union’s Regulation
on Access to and Use of Genetic Resources,
adopted in 2014 (Regulation 511/2014),87 seeks to
ensure that ex situ culture collections operating
under national laws will effectively comply with
the ABS obligations of the Nagoya Protocol.88
This carefully drafted regulation covers all the
compliance obligations of the CBD and the
Nagoya Protocol. It obliges all users to exercise
due diligence in ascertaining that the genetic
resources and associated traditional knowledge
they rely on were accessed in accordance with
applicable legal requirements and to ensure that
any resulting commercial benefits are shared
with providers as required.89 With specific regard
to ex situ resources, Regulation 511/2014 seeks
to establish a “register of collections,” whose
operations are to be certified as consistent with
international legal obligations and with the duty of
due diligence imposed under the regulation itself.90
EU member states must verify that each
collection submitted for inclusion in the register
of trusted intermediaries meets the monitoring
and record-keeping obligations it otherwise
mandates.91 All such information bearing on
due diligence will be shared with the ABS
Clearing-House being established under article
14(1) of the Nagoya Protocol and with national
authorities operating under the protocol.92
From a broader perspective, the preamble to
Regulation 511/2014 expressly recognizes that
the “collection of genetic resources in the wild
is mostly undertaken for non-commercial
purposes by academic, university and noncommercial researchers or collectors.”93 With
that in mind, the commendable objective

87 EU Regulation 511/2014, supra note 38..
82 See above note 63 and accompanying text.

88 See e.g. Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 219–225.

83 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 4; see also above notes
74–76 and accompanying text.

89 EU Regulation 511/2014, supra note 38, Preamble & arts 3–5, 21.

84 See above notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
85 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, arts 4–5, 8, 15–16; see above
notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
86 See e.g. Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 214–19
(“The Core MTA of the European Union Culture Collections’ Organization”);
see also ibid at 528–38 (“The Global Biological Resource Centers Network
[GBRCN] Demonstration Project”); ibid at 541–43 (“The Next Step: The
Microbial Resource Infrastructure (MIRRI) as a European Stepping Stone to
the GBRCN”). See generally David Smith & Philippe Desmeth, Access and
Benefit Sharing: A Main Preoccupation of the World Federation for Culture
Collections (WFCC) (2007), online: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/media/57a08be9e5274a27b2000e55/CBD-2007-Smith-Desmeth.pdf>.

90 See ibid, arts 4–5.
91 See ibid, art 5(3). See also Kate Davis, Eliana Fontes & Luciane Marinoni,
“Ex situ collections and the Nagoya Protocol: A briefing on the exchange
of specimens between European and Brazilian ex situ collections, and the
state of the art of relevant ABS practices” (Background paper prepared
for the International Workshop on the role to be played by biological
collections under the Nagoya Protocol, 6th EU/Brazil Sectoral Dialogue
Support Facility, Brazil, 18–20 June 2013), online: <http://sectordialogues.
org/sites/default/files/acoes/documentos/background_paper.pdf>.
92 See EU Regulation 511/2014, supra note 38, arts 6–7. See generally
Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 221–25.
93 EU Regulation 511/2014, supra note 38, Preamble, s 27.
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of the regulation is to repress biopiracy.94
Nonetheless, the legal foundations of the
regulation remain open to question.
Under a strict reading of the Nagoya Protocol, for
example, there are arguably only two recognized
legal routes for accessing genetic resources under
the CBD, namely, the bilateral approach for caseby-case acquisitions of in situ materials,95 and
the multilateral regime for facilitated access
to ex situ genetic resources now validated by
article 4 of the protocol.96 Given this premise, one
may ask whether the public microbial culture
collections, in and of themselves, can fashion a
sui generis legal status as trusted intermediaries
for accessing and exchanging ex situ microbial
genetic resources. Their own SMTAs, however
carefully constructed, would not seem to provide
the kind of basic international legal instrument
envisioned by article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol.97
The European Union’s Regulation 511/2014 could,
of course, provide a basic international instrument
for its own member states as required under
article 4 of the protocol.98 But does Regulation
511/2014 suffice to create the kind of multilateral
regime envisioned by article 4(4)? Neither the
Nagoya Protocol nor the CBD expressly recognizes
the status of “trusted intermediaries,” falling
somewhere in between case-by-case negotiations
under the bilateral approach or the take-and-pay
rules embodied in the ITPGRFA, which do fulfill
the ABS obligations of the CBD. In other words, is
there room under article 4 of the Nagoya Protocol
for the kind of contractually constructed access
regime envisioned by Regulation 511/2014, based
on the concept of due diligence by “trusted
intermediaries”? Or does such a concept fall outside
of the safe harbour established by that same article?
And even if Regulation 511/2014 can somehow be
reconciled with the Nagoya Protocol’s safe harbour,
what about all of the WFCC’s important microbial

94 Ibid, ss 3, 6, 9, 10.
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culture collections operating outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of that same instrument?99
A safer and better approach would seem to require
the WFCC to reorganize itself as an international
entity that governs a multilateral regime of
facilitated access to ex situ microbial genetic
resources and related traditional knowledge.
In so doing, it need not copy the rather clumsy
governance model adopted for the ITPGRFA,
whose defects have elicited a growing literature.100
On the contrary, there are now a number of
organizational models for pooling scientific inputs
and outputs that are far more flexible and more
science-friendly than the top-down administrative
structures supporting the crop commons.101

Envisioning a Multilateral
Regime of Facilitated
Access to Ex Situ Microbial
Genetic Resources
Once the WFCC’s microbial culture collections
folded themselves into a multilateral format
with built-in benefit-sharing arrangements, their
public culture collections — like the CGIAR’s
seed banks102 — would immediately acquire a
recognized, preferential status under article 4 of the
Nagoya Protocol.103 As a result, national courts and
administrators enforcing ABS obligations under the
Nagoya Protocol to the CBD should recognize and
validate SMTAs emanating from the corresponding

99 For the geographical scope of the WFCC’s microbial culture collections,
see generally Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 4
(“The Existing Microbial Research Commons Confronts Proprietary
Obstacles”) at 167–99 (citing authorities).

95 See above notes 15–25 and accompanying text.

100 See e.g. ibid at 130–42 (“Strengths and Weaknesses of the ITPGRFA”).

96 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 4(4) (legitimizing “specialized
international access and benefit-sharing instrument[s]…consistent with…
the objectives of the Convention and this Protocol” that may arise in the
future). See further Godt, supra note 1 at 258.

101 See generally ibid, ch 9 (“Institutional Models for a Transnational Research
Commons”); see also ibid, ch 10 at 579–650 (describing a proposed new
governance model for a redesigned microbial research commons).

97 See above notes 75–76 and accompanying text.

102 ITPGRFA, supra note 40. See also above notes 43–46 and accompanying
text.

98 See above notes 75–83 and accompanying text.

103 See Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 4(1).
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multilateral regime as both enforceable and
sufficient to comply with these obligations.104
The formation of a multilateral regime would further
provide the public microbial culture collections
with a governance structure to address ongoing
problems for which both science and industry
need timely answers.105 For example, under the
European Union’s Regulation 511/2014,106 questions
have resurfaced about the temporal scope of liability
under the CBD, with particular regard to new uses
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge
that were acquired before the Nagoya Protocol
to the CBD took effect in 2014. Provider countries
in their domestic laws generally insist that new
uses of older genetic resources do require ABS
agreements, while the European Union’s regulation
exempts such uses on weak legal grounds.107
The European Union’s Regulation 511/2014 on
genetic resources in public collections also limits
recognition of any “associated” traditional knowledge
that could trigger benefit-sharing obligations to
express commitments specified in any contractual
agreements between the parties that deal with
these obligations.108 This approach attempts to
prevent provider governments from claiming
that other related traditional knowledge beyond
that specified in any given SMTA between public
collections and users was actually and wrongfully
misappropriated. By the same token, the regulation
does not require due diligence with regard to uses of
genetic resources and traditional knowledge in the
case of products developed outside the territorial
boundaries of the European Union and then
imported into that territory.109 All of these positions
are open to question under the Nagoya Protocol.110
Looking beyond the European Union’s Regulation
511/2014, the criteria for legitimate access to
traditional knowledge have generally been tightened
under the Nagoya Protocol. For example, where local
104 Ibid, arts 4(2)–4(4); ITPGRFA, supra note 40. See also above notes
42–50 and accompanying text (ABS under the ITPGRFA).
105 For a survey of different governance models, see supra note 101.
106 See supra notes 67–99 and accompanying text.
107 See e.g. Barbara Lassen et al, The two worlds of Nagoya — ABS
legislation in the EU and provider countries: discrepancies and how to
deal with them (Zurich & Cape Town: Public Eye & Natural Justice, 2016)
at 7–12. See also Kamau, Fedder & Winter, supra note 74 at 255.

communities have obtained the right to grant access
to traditional knowledge, would-be users must obtain
PIC and otherwise comply with the communities’
own ABS conditions.111 Signatories to the treaty
should inform users of traditional knowledge
about their obligations under the CBD,112 and local
communities should be encouraged to codify these
MAT and ABS obligations in protocols and model
contractual clauses available to the public.113
While these and other provisions of the Nagoya
Protocol could seriously complicate microbiological
research, WFCC culture collections adhering to a
memorandum of understanding that established
a multilateral regime of facilitated access to ex situ
microbial genetic resources could directly address
them through a suitably devised governing body.114
The governing body would, in turn, presumably have
the capacity to deal with such issues by agreement
of the member governments duly appointed to that
body for such purposes.115 The governing body of such
a “microbial research commons” could thus resolve
these and other issues for purposes of enabling
facilitated exchanges of ex situ materials held by the
member collections, even though the Conference
of the Parties to the CBD had not yet fully resolved
relevant uncertainties in pre-existing international
law.116 In the long run, empirical evidence arising from
decisions along these lines by the governing bodies
of both the crop commons and a microbial research
commons could support better-informed decisions
by the Conference of the Parties to the CBD itself.
A redesigned microbial research commons should,
moreover, strive to avoid some of the weaknesses of
the crop commons that lurked beneath its otherwise
ambitious and idealistic framework principles.117 For
example, the SMTAs implementing a multilateral
microbial research commons should contain a built-

111 See Kamau, Fedder & Winter, supra note 74 at 252, citing Nagoya
Protocol, supra note 28, arts 5.2, 5.5, 6.2(f), 7.
112 Nagoya Protocol, supra note 28, art 12.2.
113 Ibid, arts 12.1, 12.3. See further Kamau, Fedder & Winter, supra note 74
at 252 (also stressing the need for capacity building under the Nagoya
Protocol, article 22).
114 Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 9 at 494–543.
115 Ibid at 526–41 (discussing the GBRCN Demonstration Project, for an
empirical test of such a regime).

109 Ibid at 15–16.

116 See e.g. Kamau, Fedder & Winter, supra note 74 at 256 (emphasizing
uncertainties regarding basic research under articles 5.2 and 6.3. of the
Nagoya Protocol still to be worked out by the drafters of model ABS
agreements).

110 Ibid.

117 See above notes 47–50 and accompanying text.

108 See Lassen et al, supra note 107 at 13–14.
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in research exemption, together with mandatory
take-and-pay benefit-sharing obligations applicable
in all cases. In other words, users should be free
to undertake any research, whether scientific or
applied, coupled with an absolute duty to pay
a compensatory royalty on any downstream
commercial applications to help support the costs
of the commons and to fund scientific research on
microbial genetic resources, especially in provider
countries.118 A small user’s access fee could also be
charged for similar purposes. Needless to say, the
tracking system for scientific uses of microbes — a
long-standing feature of microbiological research119
— should be retained and further perfected, in
order to avoid problems arising from the lack of any
tracking mechanisms for plant cultivars obtained
from the crop commons.120 The World Data Centre
for Microorganisms (WDCM) should also be fully
integrated into the proposed multilateral regime.121
Above all, the organizers of a redesigned microbial
research commons should not imitate the rigid
governance structure of the crop commons122 but
instead devise and adopt a more science-driven
governance apparatus, in which scientists as
delegates would have a legally protected voice
and voting role, alongside government officials.123
To this end, the strengths and weaknesses of a
number of existing science commons initiatives
launched in the past few years should be empirically
evaluated,124 in order to design an innovative,
more science-friendly governance structure that
breaks with the tendency of existing models to
imitate the bureaucratic administrative models
of many intergovernmental organizations.125

118 For detailed proposals to this effect, see Reichman, Uhlir &
Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, ch 5, at 260–90 (“Designing a Third
Option: Ex Ante ‘Take and Pay’ Rules for Stimulating Research and
Applications”). For related governance considerations, see ibid, ch 10, at
598–636 (“Implementing the Multilateral Regime for Facilitated Access to
Ex Situ Microbial Genetic Resources”).
119 Ibid at 173–74 (unique strain identifiers in WFCC standard practice).
120 See above notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
121 See Reichman, Uhlir & Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3, 426–29, 624–28
(discussing WDCM).
122 Ibid at 495–504 (“The Global Crop Commons: A Treaty-Based
Intergovernmental Entity”).
123 Ibid, ch 10, at 579–98 (“Organizational and Structural Considerations”).
124 Ibid, ch 9, at 494–544 (“Selected Empirically Relevant Governance
Approaches”).
125 Ibid at 544–67 (“In Search of a Politically Acceptable and Scientifically
Productive Operational Framework”).

12

CIGI Papers No. 158 — January 2018 • Jerome H. Reichman

In sum, a pressing need for the WFCC to reorganize
its existing microbial research commons in
order to comply effectively and efficiently with
the ABS obligations of the Nagoya Protocol to
the CBD also creates an opportunity to devise a
new, more enlightened governance regime that
could become a model on which future science
commons could build.126 Moreover, a multilateral
regime of public microbial culture collections, once
properly installed, could strive to support and link
up with other relevant commons initiatives, such
as the COMPARE Project on infectious diseases
underway in the European Union127 and WHO’s
PIP Framework,128 in a comprehensive knowledge
commons supported by the superb digital
framework already embodied in the WDCM.129
A multilateral regime of public microbial culture
collections, if properly organized into a true
knowledge commons, could thus yield scientific
payoffs well beyond the needed compliance with
the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD. By providing
scientifically validated genetic resources, traditional
knowledge and related data for research and
applications in compliance with international law
from a central portal, it could become a crucial
component of the global scientific infrastructure.
In turn, that infrastructure should generate more
and better research inputs and outputs across
scientific disciplines. In other words, a properly
redesigned microbial research commons should
help to forge a pathway to enable scientists
everywhere to overcome the legal and institutional
barriers that might otherwise stand in the way
of the New Biology paradigm put forward by the
US National Academies in 2009.130 That paradigm,
indeed, was a primary inspiration for undertaking
the entire project on which this paper is based.

126 See e.g. Brett M Frischmann, Michael J Madison & Katherine J Strandburg,
eds, Governing Knowledge Commons (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014); Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions
for Collective Action (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
127 See Collaborative Management Platform for Detection and Analysis of
(Re-)emerging and Foodborne Outbreaks in Europe (COMPARE), News
item, “Pilot project on Machine Learning and Antimicrobial Resistance”
(25 September 2017), online: <www.compare-europe.eu/news/2017/09/
pilot-project-on-machine-learning-and-antimicrobial-resistance?id=45fed1d23bfb-4ab7-ad6e-3a17e512baa4>.
128 See PIP Framework, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
129 See the text accompanying note 121.
130 See National Research Council, supra note 1. See further Reichman, Uhlir
& Dedeurwaerdere, supra note 3 at 19–36.
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